Cache Subsidies for an Optimal Memory for Bandwidth Tradeoff in the
  Access Network by Ahmadi, Mahdieh et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
06
65
9v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 19
 A
ug
 20
19
1
Cache Subsidies for an Optimal Memory for
Bandwidth Tradeoff in the Access Network
Mahdieh Ahmadi, James Roberts, Emilio Leonardi, and Ali Movaghar, Senior Member IEEE
Abstract—While the cost of the access network could be
considerably reduced by the use of caching, this is not currently
happening because content providers (CPs), who alone have the
detailed demand data required for optimal content placement,
have no natural incentive to use them to minimize access net-
work operator (ANO) expenditure. We argue that ANOs should
therefore provide such an incentive in the form of direct subsidies
paid to the CPs in proportion to the realized savings. We apply
coalition game theory to design the required subsidy framework
and propose a distributed algorithm, based on Lagrangian
decomposition, allowing ANOs and CPs to collectively realize the
optimal memory for bandwidth tradeoff. The considered access
network is a cache hierarchy with per-CP central office caches,
accessed by all ANOs, at the apex, and per-ANO dedicated
bandwidth and storage resources at the lower levels, including
wireless base stations, that must be shared by multiple CPs.
Index Terms—Network economics, Content distribution,
Caching, Cache subsidy
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of the Web and the explosive expansion
of the Internet, network operators have recognized the poten-
tial for significantly reducing infrastructure costs by locally
caching copies of popular contents rather than fetching them
repeatedly from a remote source. However, despite the clear
and increasing economic advantages of caching, it remains
true that content is rarely stored at any site closer to end users
than points of presence (PoPs) situated well upstream of the
access network.
Network operator caching ambitions were initially stymied
by more effective competition from global reach content
distribution networks (CDNs) like Akamai. More significantly,
content providers (CPs), like Google, Facebook and Netflix
who came later and are now the source of most Internet
traffic, have developed lucrative business models that rely on
exclusive knowledge of their respective customer base. They
preserve this knowledge by encrypting transmissions and thus
prevent operators from transparently caching their contents.
CPs do cache popular content in ISP PoPs both to reduce
their costs and to improve end user quality of experience.
However, they have hardly any additional incentive to move
caches even closer to users within the access network. It is
the main thesis of this paper that network operators need
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Fig. 1: Access network topology
to create such an incentive by financially rewarding CPs for
content placements that reduce infrastructure costs. The gain
from optimizing the memory for bandwidth tradeoff realized
by caching is considerable and network operators, CPs and
ultimately end-users will all benefit significantly.
We consider the simple tree-shaped access network topology
depicted in Fig. 1. The root of the tree is a central office (CO)
equipped as a datacenter [1]. This is a hub connecting multiple
access network operators (ANOs) to the Internet via an ISP.
An ANO might, for instance, be a mobile network operator
with base stations (BSs) at the lowest layer, or a fixed network
operator with optical network units (ONUs) shared by users in
the same building. These ANOs may have intermediate nodes
housing a cloud-radio access network (C-RAN) or an optical
line terminal (OLT), respectively. These intermediate nodes are
assumed to have (micro-)datacenter capabilities, like the CO,
enabling flexible storage provision while base stations have
just a limited capacity cache memory such as a solid-state
disk. All ANOs deliver contents from all CPs and demand
is assumed independent of content placements. This network
model is clearly not completely general but is intended to be
sufficiently generic to illustrate the challenges raised by the
design and implementation of cache subsidies.
The use of subsidies to drive an optimal memory for
bandwidth tradeoff in the access network is, to the authors’
knowledge, an original proposal. The main contributions of
the paper are as follows:
• the potential savings to be gained from an optimal trade-
2off are roughly quantified suggesting that they may count
in billions of dollars per year for a large network operator;
• the need for CP subsidies as a catalyst for realizing these
savings is identified as a consequence of the powerful
position of the CPs in the ANO two-sided market;
• coalition game theory is applied to determine how the
cost of a CP cache in the CO should be shared between
the ANOs using it and how much they contribute to the
subsidy;
• a distributed scheme is proposed to optimize the access
network tradeoff where CPs optimally place content
based on unit storage and bandwidth prices while these
prices are modulated by ANOs as necessary to meet
capacity constraints.
The following four sections successively present these contri-
butions. We discuss related work in the penultimate section
before drawing conclusions and highlighting directions for
further study.
II. MEMORY FOR BANDWIDTH TRADEOFF
This section discusses the memory bandwidth tradeoff for
an access network taking the form of a tree, assuming known
demand and given storage and bandwidth costs.
A. Cache performance
We consider a catalogue of contents F with a large number
F of items (‘files’) that, to simplify but without loss of
generality, we assume to be of constant size. To estimate
cache hit probabilities, we assume requests for each content
f generate traffic at rate λ f content downloads per second,
proportional to a popularity law q f , i.e. λ f = Tq f where∑
f ∈F q
f
= 1, q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qF and T is the overall traffic
demand in downloads per second. T here is the peak traffic
used for network dimensioning.
For the present work we assume the performance of a cache
of size C is ideal, yielding a hit probability h(C) =
∑
f ≤C q
f .
This would be realized by proactive placement of the most
popular items. Note that reactive caching policies like least
recently used (LRU) are not efficient in the access network
where demand is low relative to the rate of content churn [2].
Performance depends significantly on the popularity law.
Observations consistently show that request rates for the most
popular items roughly follow a Zipf law, q f ∝ f −α, with
α ≈ 0.8 (e.g., [3]). There is however a very large amount
of content in the tail of the distribution whose popularity
is imperfectly estimated but is much smaller than would be
predicted by the Zipf law [4], [5]. This high volume content,
like old photos posted on Facebook or family videos shared
on YouTube, is stored in CP datacenters but is hardly ever
cached. For the evaluations in this paper, we generally assume
the catalogue F does follow a Zipf law with a useful size F
corresponding to a volume of data between 1 TB and 1 PB,
it being implicitly assumed that this only represents the most
popular contents.
TABLE I: Frequently Used Notation.
k ∈ K CP index
a ∈ A ANO index
f ∈ F file index
n ∈ N cache node index
l ∈ L leaf index
i ∈ I intermediate node index
Fk catalog of CP k with size Fk = | Fk |
rak CP k share of ANO a cost saving
λ
f
n demand for content f at node n
Ta traffic demand from ANO a users
q
f
a popularity law of ANO a demand over F
Cnk cache size of CP k at node n
Λnk residual traffic of CP k routed over link n
Sn cache size limit at node n
Bn bandwidth limit on link n
sn cost of storage at node n
bn cost of bandwidth between node n and its parent
h(C) hit probability of cache of size C
B. Costs of storage and bandwidth
Caching trades off the cost of storage for the cost of
bandwidth. While the cost of storage is well-known, it proves
difficult to obtain accurate estimates of the bandwidth cost.
This should be known to the network providers realizing the
tradeoff but for the present paper we are obliged to make
simplifying assumptions.
The cost of bandwidth is the cost of all transport and routing
equipment dimensioned to carry busy period traffic between
given points in the network with adequate quality of service.
We assume this cost is proportional to peak demand. Costs
clearly depend on the particular network instance in question
but for the present discussion we consider a fixed cost per unit
of busy hour demand. This might, for instance, be the long run
average incremental cost (LRIC) used by telecommunications
regulators.
A bandwidth cost used in prior work was derived from the
marginal cost of backhaul charged to mobile network operators
in France at $2 per Mb/s per month [2]. An alternative estimate
derives from the cost of bandwidth charged by Cloud providers
like Google [6]. Catalogue GB per month download prices
convert to a monthly rate of around $4 per Mb/s of busy hour
traffic1.
A rough cost of storage can be deduced from the rates
charged by Cloud providers. A monthly rate of around $0.03
per GB is the current offer for frequent access storage [6].
C. Realizing the optimal tradeoff
We model an access network bringing download traffic to
users as a tree network with facility for cache storage at each of
its nodes (Fig. 2). The network has a set of N nodes with root
at node 0, the CO. Caches at the lowest tier (e.g., base stations)
constitute the set of leaf nodes L. Demand for content f from
leaf node l is λ
f
l
downloads/s. The unit cost of bandwidth
between source and root is b0 and the cost between any other
node n and its parent is bn. Unit storage cost at node n is sn.
The placement which minimizes the total storage and band-
width cost can be determined independently for each content.
1Assuming busy hour demand is 1/8t h of daily traffic.
3Fig. 2: Three tier access network with nodes N , including root
0, leaves L and intermediate nodes I with storage cost sn and
bandwidth cost bn.
To place each content f we must solve an uncapacitated
facility location (UFL) problem on a tree. The UFL solution
specifies the optimal set of nodes S which minimizes the
overall cost for the given content:
S = arg min
S⊆N
( ∑
n∈S
sn +
∑
l∈L
λ
f
l
min
n∈S
∑
lm≺n
bm
)
, (1)
where the summation range denoted l  m ≺ n covers the set
of links in the unique path from l to n.
The literature provides algorithms to solve this problem,
e.g. Cornuejols et al. [7] has an O(N2) algorithm while Shah
et al. [8] improves this to O(N log N). The UFL algorithm
should be applied successively for contents in decreasing order
of overall demand,
∑
l∈L λ
f
l
. Application can cease when
placement of at least one locally more popular content has
previously been refused at every node.
D. Quantifying the tradeoff
While it is in general necessary to perform optimal place-
ment using an UFL algorithm, to gain intuition we adopt
a simpler network model in this subsection. We consider a
symmetric 3-tier tree where demand at each leaf is statistically
identical and total demand is T over all the leaves. The root
at tier 3 has e2 tier 2 children each of which has e1 tier 1
children (the leaves).
As catalogues and cache sizes are large, it is reasonable for
the present evaluation to consider F and C as real variables
and to reason in terms of bytes rather than discrete contents
[2]. The hit probability for a Zipf(α) popularity law is approx-
imated by h(C) = (C/F)1−α, derived on replacing summations∑
f ≤C q
f by an integral. Monthly storage costs are s(i) at tier i
nodes, i.e., a cache of size C costs Cs(i) per month. Bandwidth
cost to bring content from the next highest tier to tier i (or
from source to root when i = 0) is denoted b(i), i.e., the cost
to transmit demand T is Tb(i) per month.
Assuming storage is possible at each node, the minimum
cost network is such that tier 1 nodes cache the C1 most
popular bytes of content, tier 2 nodes cache the next C2 most
popular while the root caches the next C3, for some values of
C1, C2 and C3. Network cost is then,
cost = e1e2C1s
(1)
+ e2C2s
(2)
+ C3s
(3)
+ T
(
(1 − h(C1)) b
(1)
+
+ (1 − h(C1 + C2)) b
(2)
+ (1 − h(C1 + C2 + C3)) b
(3)
)
.
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Fig. 3: Access network cost savings against cost factor Γ =
(Tb(i))/(Fs(i)); b(1) = b(2) = b(3) = $4 per Mb/s per mth, s(1) =
s(2) = s(3) = $0.03 per GB per mth, Zipf(0.8) popularities.
For practically relevant parameter values, standard methods
yield optimal cache sizes:
C1 = F ×min
{
1,
(
(1 − α)Tb(1)
Fe2(e1s(1) − s(2))
)1/α}
,
C1 + C2 = F ×min
{
1,
(
(1 − α)Tb(2)
F(e2s(2) − s(3))
)1/α}
,
C1 + C2 + C3 = F ×min
{
1,
(
(1 − α)Tb(3)
Fs(3)
)1/α}
. (2)
Optimal cache sizes when storage is not possible at one or
two tiers can be similarly derived. Fig. 3 plots comparative
gains for a network with parameter values, given in the
caption, that are meant to be representative of a mobile
access network [2]. Savings are plotted against the cost factor
Γ = (Tb(i))/(Fs(i)), that here summarizes the impact of the
individual parameters. The figure compares savings possible
with caches at all tiers, caches at tiers 1 and 3, caches at tiers
1 and 2 and caches at tier 1 only.
A first remark is that the savings are potentially very large,
especially for high Γ. For instance, a total demand volume of
10 Gb/s from 1000 BSs for a CP catalogue volume of 10 TB
corresponds here to Γ = 133 and an optimal saving of more
than 70% for the data of Fig. 3a. Data gathered by Perillo
et al. [9] provide a reality check on the size of the savings
possible through an optimal tradeoff: the annual revenue of
network operators is measured in tens of billions of dollars
(e.g., $130B for AT&T in 2013) and CapEx is roughly 15%
of this. Since most expenditure is for the access network, we
estimate that potential annual savings are measured in billions
of dollars.
Fig. 3a shows that most savings in this example come
from caches at the two lower tiers, 1 and 2, while tier 1 BS
caches alone are generally inadequate. When fanout values are
inversed in Fig. 3b, however, a cache at tier 3 (the CO) brings
greater savings than a cache at tier 2 for Γ < 102. In general,
caches at all three layers significantly contribute to the overall
savings.
III. THE CONTENT DELIVERY BUSINESS
We discuss the business environment arguing ANOs must
subsidize CPs in order to realize the optimal memory for
bandwidth tradeoff.
4A. Content providers
Major content providers like Netflix, YouTube and Face-
book currently generate the vast majority of Internet traf-
fic [10]. These CPs represent multi-billion dollar businesses
gaining considerably more revenue and having greater market
power than the network operators on which they rely for
content delivery. We include CDNs like Akamai among the
CPs as they also manage large volumes of traffic and have
similar business relations with the ANOs.
The CP business model generally relies on exclusive and
deep knowledge of customer behavior, used for recommen-
dation systems, ad placement and other strategic marketing
activities. Customer behavior is also rightly considered to
be highly confidential and for this reason alone would not
be shared with any network operator seeking to realize the
memory bandwidth tradeoff. The significant gains highlighted
in the previous section must be realized therefore by exploiting
the CPs extensive knowledge of how customer demand is
distributed over its content catalogue while preserving the
exclusivity of this knowledge.
B. A two-sided market
An Internet access network, viewed as a platform, is a two-
sided market where end-users constitute the “money side” and
CPs the “subsidy side”: end-users consume content and pay
the ANO for connectivity while CPs supply the content and
typically do not pay anything to the ANO for the traffic this
generates [11]. The absence of compensation from the CPs is
frequently the source of ANO complaints and has generated
heated discussions about network neutrality (e.g., Comcast
versus Netflix in the US, Free versus Google in France). To
incite compensation, the ANOs might be tempted to provide
less than adequate bandwidth to carry generated traffic by non-
paying CPs but the impact on quality mainly hurts their paying
end-user customers. CPs typically do pay the ISPs to which
their servers connect but these are usually distinct from the
considered ANOs. Proposals for sharing the revenue between
“CP ISPs” and “eyeball ISPs” have, to our knowledge, never
been implemented [12].
Of course, CPs do employ caching, typically placing ded-
icated servers in one or a small number of PoPs in the
ISP network upstream of the CO and the access networks
considered here [13]–[15]. This is advantageous both to reduce
the load of their datacenters and to improve customer QoE
through lower latency. The propagation time is typically much
smaller from the PoP than from the remote origin datacenter
and has a significant impact on latency which is in turn very
important for customer satisfaction. On the other hand, the
small additional reduction in propagation time due to moving
the cache from the PoP to any of the access network cache
locations considered here has a negligible impact on perceived
latency and QoE. We believe enhanced QoE and its supposed
impact on market share is therefore unlikely to motivate CP
cooperation in realizing the optimal memory for bandwidth
tradeoff.
C. Subsidized content placement
We claim ANOs need to persuade CPs to optimally place
content in access network caches by sharing the resulting
gain with them in the form of a direct subsidy. Consider, for
illustration, an isolated cache dedicated to a given CP. The CP
places content set C in the cache at total cost C × s where
C = |C|. End-users generate download traffic T of which a
proportion h(C) is served by the cache. Bandwidth has unit
cost b so that the cache brings a net saving,
E(C) = Th(C) · b − C · s. (3)
The CP will have an incentive to cache the contents that max-
imize these savings if it receives a subsidy that is proportional
to E(C). Both ANO and CP gain with this proposal. The
remainder of this paper is about how such a subsidy might
be realized in practice for the hierarchical access network
discussed in Sec. II-C. We first introduce the network model.
D. Network model
The considered network topology is as depicted in Fig.
1. It is a tree rooted on the central office, CO. The CO
cache is shared by all the ANO instances connected to it
while caches in downstream nodes, including base stations,
are dedicated to their particular ANO instance. This topology
is based on European Internet access. It is not perfectly
general but usefully illustrates the main issues to be resolved.
Extensions would be necessary, for instance, to account for
ANO infrastructure sharing [16], or to more efficiently use
base station caches when coverage areas overlap [17].
Multi-access edge computing (MEC) would be realized by
the CO, intermediate nodes (CRANs or OLTs, say) or leaf
nodes (base stations or ONUs), depending in particular on the
latency requirements of the application in question. However,
for content delivery, the latency from a cache in any location
would be sufficiently small and is not a placement criterion.
We suppose the CO and transit ISP are owned by entities
distinct from the ANOs, if necessary by imposed unbundling
regulations. The former sell storage capacity and bandwidth
at fixed unit rates and capacity is assumed unlimited. Other
resources are assumed to belong to the specific ANO and their
usage can be controlled by adjusting the “prices” b and s used
to compute the CP subsidy.
IV. SHARING A CENTRAL OFFICE CACHE
We apply game theory to analyse value sharing between a
CP and a set of ANOs who contribute to the cost of the CP
cache at the central office.
A. A coalition game
In our network model in Sec. III-D, the CO hub is common
to multiple ANOs. It provides cache space to CPs and is a
gateway for IP transit. We analyse the memory for bandwidth
tradeoff at the CO assuming ANOs are charged a common rate
for transit bandwidth equivalent to b per unit of peak traffic,
expressed here in content downloads per second, and the CO
5storage charge is set to s per content. Available bandwidth and
storage is unlimited and the values of b and s are fixed.
The cache used by each CP is distinct from that used by any
other CP. This is required to preserve the privacy of customers
and to ensure the integrity of the CP business models. We
therefore consider a single generic CP providing content to
multiple ANOs who must share the burden of the CP subsidy
(cf. Sec. III-C).
To determine how savings due to caching should be shared,
we apply techniques from coalition game theory. The outcome
of game G(N, v) between players n ∈ N is determined by the
value function v(S) defined as the collective gain realizable by
any sub-coalition S ⊆ N . The objective is to specify how the
value should be distributed between players to maximize the
gain while satisfying certain properties. The value distribution,
Φ : G → R |N | , defines the amount allocated to each player.
The following are two important concepts from coalition game
theory [18]:
• the core of game G(N, v) is the set of all distributions
Φn, for n ∈ N , such that no group of players would gain
more by leaving to form a sub-coalition S ⊂ N ,
• the Shapley value is the unique value distribution that
satisfies four properties known as efficiency, symmetry,
linearity and null player.
Denote the generic CP by CP and the set of ANOs by A.
We consider games over players {CP∪A} with value function
such that v(S) = 0 for any S ⊆ A (i.e., any sub-coalition
excluding CP) and
v(CP ∪ S) = max
C⊆F
E(C,S),
where E(C,S) is the overall saving (cf. Sec. III-C),
E(C,S) =
∑
a∈S
(Taha(C) · b) − C · s, (4)
with ha(C) =
∑
f ∈C q
f
a.
Let C∗(S) denote the set of contents that maximize savings
(4) and write λ
f
a for Taq
f
a, the residual demand routed to
the CO for content f from ANO a users. The following
proposition characterizes C∗.
Proposition IV.1.
C∗(S) =
{
f ∈ F :
∑
a∈S
λ
f
a > s/b
}
. (5)
Proof. We can re-write (4) as
E(C,S) =
∑
f ∈C
( ∑
a∈S
(λ
f
a · b) − s
)
. (6)
Clearly, E(C,S) is maximized by including in C all contents
for which the term in parentheses is positive. 
B. Game between CP and ANO
To better understand the relation between CP and ANOs,
we first assume the CP cache is dedicated to a single ANO,
denoted ANO, and consider the game G = ({CP, ANO}, v) with
value function
v({CP, ANO}) = E(C∗, ANO),
where C∗ = arg maxC⊆F E(C, ANO), and v(S) =
0 for any S ⊂ {CP, ANO}. It is straightforward to verify
that the core of this game consists of shares
ΦCP = r × E(C
∗, ANO)
ΦANO = (1 − r) × E(C
∗, ANO),
for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
Any member of the core with r > 0 has the essential
property that CP will self-interestedly choose to cache the
maximizing set of contents C∗. Moreover, any r ∈ (0, 1) brings
positive gain to both players and might be considered to define
a suitable outcome.
In considering a similar tradeoff game, Douros et al. [19]
propose to use the Shapley value which, in the present case
can readily be shown to correspond to equal shares, r = 0.5.
It is not obvious, however, that such a choice would be
acceptable to either CP or ANO. We believe the appropriate
value should reflect the relative bargaining power of CP and
ANO (depending, for instance, on the size of their respective
customer bases) and be decided by bilateral negotiation. Such
negotiation determines a weighted Shapley value, as defined
in [20].
We suppose the optimal tradeoff will be realized as follows.
CP makes the cache placement C∗ that maximizes its subsidy
ΦCP based on its private estimate of {λ
f
ANO
}. Learning the
placement size C∗, ANO pays the CO C∗s for storage and
pays the transit ISP T (1 − h(C∗))b for traffic. Note that the
latter payment would be for realized traffic that might differ
from the CP estimate. ANO additionally makes a side payment
of r(Th(C∗)b − C∗s) to CP. The correctness of payments is
verifiable since both CP and ANO are aware of cache size C
and are able to measure traffics T and Th(C∗).
C. Game between multiple ANOs
Consider now multiple ANOs that can all download content
from the same CP cache. The objective is to determine how
the ANOs should share the cost of the cache and realize
appropriate side payments to CP.
Define the game G(A, v) where the value function is
v(S) = E(C∗,S), given by (4) with C∗ the maximizing set of
contents for S ⊆ A. This game does not explicitly include CP
since we assume its share is determined by the share parameter
ra negotiated independently with each ANO, as discussed in
Sec. IV-B. The value distribution over S, denoted {Φa(C,S)}
defines the saving of ANO a for a ∈ S, to be shared with CP
so that the overall subsidy is
sub(C,S) =
∑
a∈S
raΦa(C,S). (7)
We claim the distribution {Φa(C,A)} should ideally satisfy
the following properties:
• coalition incentive: the distribution should encourage all
ANOs to share the same CP cache; this will happen when
the distribution {Φa(C,A)} is in the core of game G,
• efficiency: total distributed value should be equal to the
value function, i.e.,
∑
a∈A Φa(C,A) = E(C,A),
6• optimality: the CP subsidy (7) must be proportional to
E(C,S) given by (4) to induce it to realize the overall
optimal placement C∗,
• neutrality: the CP placement C∗ should be independent of
the respective bargaining power of ANOs as manifested
by the ra,
• verifiability: the savings distribution should be readily
computable and verifiable by the ANOs and CP.
Supposing ANOs should only pay for their own traffic while
sharing the cost of storage, we consider distributions of the
form,
Φa(C,S) = Taha(C) · b − ζa(C)C · s, (8)
=
∑
f ∈C
(
λ
f
a · b − ηa( f ) · s
)
, (9)
where ζa(C) and ηa( f ) are fractional shares, to be defined,
and such that
∑
f ∈C ηa( f ) = ζa(C)C and
∑
a∈S ζa(C) = 1.
The latter condition is required for efficiency.
Theorem IV.1 defines the unique distribution of this form
that is valid for general traffic and arbitrary subsidy fractions.
Theorem IV.1. Under general traffic {λ
f
a} and arbitrary
subsidy fractions {ra}, the distribution {Φa(C,S)} in (9) is
optimal and neutral over coalition S ⊆ A, if and only if,
ηa( f ) =
λ
f
a∑
n∈S λ
f
n
,∀a ∈ S. (10)
Moreover, the distribution Φa(C,A) is in the core of G(A, v).
Proof. From (7) and (9), the CP subsidy is
sub(C,S) =
∑
f ∈C
( ∑
n∈S
rnλ
f
n · b −
∑
n∈S
rnηn( f ) · s
)
. (11)
This is maximal if and only if CP chooses to cache contents
f such that
∑
n∈S rnλ
f
n∑
n∈S rnηn( f )
>
s
b
. (12)
For optimality, this condition must coincide with (5) so that,
∑
n∈S
λ
f
n =
∑
n∈S rnλ
f
n∑
n∈S rnηn( f )
, ∀ f ∈ F .
For neutrality, this equation must be an identity with respect to
the {ra} yielding expression (10) on setting particular values
ra = 1 and rn = 0 for n , a.
To prove sufficiency, using (10) in (12) gives the condition
of Proposition IV.1. The shares are thus optimal. Sharing
is also neutral since the set defined by Proposition IV.1 is
independent of {ra}.
To prove {Φa(C,A)} is in the core, we deduce from
optimality that
v(S) = E(C∗,S) =
∑
f ∈C∗(S)
( ∑
a∈S
(λ
f
a · b) − s
)
=
∑
f ∈C∗(S)
∑
a∈S
(
λ
f
a · b −
λ
f
a∑
n∈S λ
f
n
· s
)
≤
∑
f ∈C∗(A)
∑
a∈S
(
λ
f
a · b −
λ
f
a∑
n∈A λ
f
n
· s
)
=
∑
a∈S
Φa(C
∗(A),A),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that any
content f included in the optimal set C∗(S) is necessarily also
included in C∗(A). Thus no sub-coalition has value greater
than that of the grand coalition. 
The distribution defined in Theorem IV.1 is unfortunately
not verifiable by the ANOs since ζa(C) depends on the demand
distributions λ
f
a that are unknown to them. Proposition IV.2
defines a verifiable distribution that is optimal in some special
cases.
Proposition IV.2. Over coalition S ⊆ A, the distribution
{Φa(C,S)} defined in (8) is optimal and neutral if
ζa(C) =
Taha(C)∑
n∈S Tnhn(C)
, (13)
and all ANOs have the same popularity distribution, q
f
a = q
f
for a ∈ S, and optimal if (13) holds and all ANOs apply the
same subsidy fraction, ra = r for a ∈ S.
Proof. With Φa given by (8) and (13), the CP subsidy may be
written,
sub(C,S) =
∑
n∈S rnTnhn(C)∑
n∈S Tnhn(C)
×
( ∑
a∈S
Taha(C) · b − C · s
)
. (14)
The term in parenthesis is the overall profit so that CP will
place the optimal set C∗ if the pre-factor is independent of C.
This occurs if the popularity distributions are the same for all
when hn(C) = h(C). In this case the distribution is optimal
and neutral. The pre-factor is also constant if all the ra are
equal proving optimality. 
The value distributions determined from Theorem IV.1 and
Proposition IV.2 are different except in the special case where
all popularity laws are the same. When the laws are different
and fractions rak are not the same, the value distribution deter-
mined from (13) is not optimal. Moreover, the CP is required
to maximize the subsidy defined by (14) which is non-trivial,
especially in the context of the access network as considered
in the next section. The optimal distribution determined from
(10) is therefore preferable despite the impossibility for ANOs
to independently verify their allocation.
We envisaged applying a distribution based on the Shapley
value. One possibility is to derive the Shapley value for a
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Fig. 4: Percentage difference when verifying subsidies com-
puted using Theorem IV.1 by applying formula (13);
2 ANOs, T1 = 160 Mb/s, T2 = 80 Mb/s, F = 10
7, uncorrelated
Zipf(0.8) popularities, r2 = 0.5.
fixed cache size C, compute the CP subsidy based on this,
and then suppose CP places the subsidy maximizing content
C. This distribution does not have the optimality property,
however: the CP does not have the correct incentive to optimize
the overall memory for bandwidth tradeoff. To compute the
Shapley value on supposing content placement is optimized for
each ordered sub-coalition, on the other hand, rapidly becomes
computationally intractable (as in [12], for instance).
D. Approximate verification
The value distribution determined from Theorem IV.1 has
all the desirable properties except verifiability. In this section,
we numerically explore the possibility of using ζa from (13)
in (8) to perform an approximate verification. In other words,
CP computes the optimal set C and distribution {Φa(C,A)}
by applying Theorem IV.1 while each ANO estimates the
realized shares using (13) and (8). There is of course, a
difference between predicted demand (the λ
f
a) and realized
demand (measured Taha(C)) but we ignore this discrepancy
here and consider the error arising when realized demand
actually coincides with the forecast.
We consider a CP with a catalogue of F = 107 megabyte
files. The fixed cost of storage at the CO is s = $0.03 per GB
($3 × 10−5 per content) and the cost of bandwidth is b = $4
per Mb/s. Two ANOs share the CP cache and have demand
T1 = 160 Mb/s and T2 = 80 Mb/s. The popularity law for both
is Zipf(0.8) but the ranking of contents for ANO 2 is a random
permutation of the ranking for ANO 1. Numerical results are
the average of 10 different random permutations.
Fig. 4 plots the percentage difference between the required
subsidy using (13), suba(ζ), and the subsidy due using (10),
suba(η), as a function of r1 when r2 = 0.5 is fixed. More
precisely, we plot
erra = (suba(ζ) − suba(η)) /suba(η) × 100
against r1, for a = 1 and a = 2, and the equivalent relative
error, errtot, computed for the total subsidies (14) and (11).
The 95% confidence interval estimated from the 10 different
ranking permutations is smaller than the line thickness.
As predicted by Prop. IV.2, the total subsidy is accurately
estimated when r1 = r2. The errors for individual subsidies,
however, do not vary with r1 since both the true shares
computed via ηa( f ) and the estimates computed via ζa(C) do
not depend on the ra. Importantly, the error is small despite
the extreme disparity between popularity laws. The absolute
error increases with the ratio T1/T2 but remains relatively small
(e.g., err2 < 15% for T1/T2 < 10). These results suggest it may
be possible to design a practical subsidy scheme that combines
the optimality of (9) and (10) with the verifiability of (8) and
(13). Such a design is beyond present scope, however.
V. OPTIMIZING THE TRADEOFF
We first formulate the general tradeoff optimization problem
under capacity constraints before elaborating a distributed
solution based on Lagrangian relaxation for the particular
network instance of Fig. 1. Numerical results demonstrate how
the proposed method works on a toy network example.
A. General problem formulation
We assume content placement is optimized on a daily basis.
CPs have detailed demand forecasts while ANOs are aware of
capacity limits. Externally fixed costs are known to both CPs
and ANOs. Optimal placements are realized at the start of
the day in an off-peak traffic period. Charges and subsidies
are calculated at the end of the day based on allocated cache
capacities, measured peak period demand and respective unit
resource prices.
We use the notation introduced in Sec. II-C with the addition
of storage and bandwidth capacity limits for each node n ∈ N ,
denoted Sn and Bn, respectively. We effectively assimilate the
path from n to its parent to a link of capacity Bn. CPs, k ∈ K,
and ANOs, a ∈ A, are implicitly identified by disjoint subsets
of contents, f ∈ Fk , and leaf nodes, l ∈ La, respectively. All
intermediate nodes, I = N \{L, 0}, also belong exclusively to
one ANO. Let Ia be the set of intermediate nodes belonging to
ANO a and denote all nodes belonging to a by Na = La∪Ia.
We also need notation for the cost of a path from each node
n to the source: bn+ =
∑
nm0 bm where n  m  0 covers
the set of links on the path from n to the source. Costs are
interpreted here as usage based prices. Each ANO can fix its
own prices but, for the sake of neutrality, these are applied
equally to all CPs.
Content placement is defined by indicator variables: x
f
n = 1
if content f is stored in node n and x
f
n = 0 otherwise. We
additionally define delivery variables: y
f
ln
= 1 if requests from
leaf l for content f are delivered from node n and y
f
ln
= 0
otherwise. In the optimal answer, we want to have y
f
ln
= 1
if n is the first node such that x
f
n = 1 on the path from l to
the source. The utility of a placement is equal to the overall
savings relative to a network without caches. We seek to solve
the following problem.
(ILP) maximize U(x, y) =
∑
f ∈F
U(x f , y f ), where
U(x f , y f ) =
∑
l∈L
∑
ln0
λ
f
l
y
f
ln
bn+ −
∑
n∈N
x
f
n sn, (15)
8subject to placement and delivery constraints for each content
f ∈ F , ∑
n∈N
y
f
ln
≤ 1, ∀l, (16)
y
f
ln
≤ x
f
n, ∀l, ∀n, (17)
x
f
n ∈ {0, 1}, ∀n, (18)
y
f
ln
∈ {0, 1}, ∀l, n, (19)
and capacity constraints,∑
f
x
f
n ≤ Sn, ∀n, (20)
∑
f
λ
f
l
(1 −
∑
lmn
y
f
lm
) ≤ Bn, ∀n. (21)
This integer linear program is a generalization of the NP-hard
problem of optimal content placement in cache hierarchies
[21] (where only storage constraints (20) would be imposed).
Before presenting a distributed solution based on Lagrangian
relaxation, we discuss the constraints that apply in our partic-
ular instance.
B. A specific instance
We consider the three-tier network of Fig. 1. The root
node 0 is the CO and, as assumed in Sec. IV, storage and
bandwidth are unlimited with externally fixed prices s0 and b0,
respectively. Intermediate nodes, i ∈ I, are also assumed able
to elastically provide as much storage as needed at fixed unit
price si . On the other hand, we suppose storage in leaf nodes
is limited to Sl < ∞, for l ∈ L, typically for technological
reasons.
Bandwidth in the access network is supposed to be provi-
sioned based on demand forecasts with a lead time of several
months. This means bandwidth is limited but typically more
than might be optimal at any considered instant within the
planning cycle since demand has an increasing trend. We
assume network planners are competent and ensure that no
bandwidth constraint is violated when available cache space is
optimally used, i.e., the problem does have a feasible solution.
For capacity limited resources, the ANOs fix prices that
induce CPs to optimally share available capacity. One objec-
tive would be, for instance, to fully use the limited cache in
a wireless base station. Similarly, the bandwidth price on the
link from an intermediate node i to the CO can be set to ensure
maximum utilization and thus minimize the cost of storage at
that node. Storage and bandwidth are effectively substitutable
resources: the relative elasticity of storage provision at the
intermediate nodes enables more efficient use of provisioned
bandwidth.
C. A distributed solution
The complexity of (ILP) and the separate content placement
and price setting roles of the CPs and ANOs, respectively,
impose a distributed solution. This is possible through dual La-
grangian decomposition by relaxing constraints (20) and (21)
and applying the sub-gradient method to derive an iterative
procedure. The relaxed problem is then a set of UFL instances
as introduced in Sec. II-C and can be solved independently by
the CPs.
First introduce notation for the cache size used by CP k at
node n,
Cnk =
∑
f ∈Fk
x
f
n, (22)
and the residual amount of CP k demand routed over link n,
Λ
k
n =
∑
l∈L
∑
f ∈Fk
λ
f
l
(1 −
∑
lmn
y
f
lm
). (23)
For link 0, from CO to the source, we need the per-ANO
partition of Λk
0
. Let
Λ
k
0a =
∑
l∈La
∑
f ∈Fk
λ
f
l
(1 −
∑
lm0
y
f
lm
). (24)
Finally, let ζak be the ANO a share of the CO cache cost of
CP k, computed from (9) and (10),
ζak =
1
C0k
∑
f ∈C0k
∑
l∈La
λ
f
l
y
f
l0∑
l∈L λ
f
l
y
f
l0
. (25)
For our specific network instance, utility can then be ex-
pressed as,
U(x, y) =
∑
a∈A
Ua(x, y), (26)
where
Ua(x, y) =
∑
k∈K
(
(
∑
l∈La
T kl − Λ
k
0a)b0 −
− ζakC0k s0 −
∑
i∈Ia
Cik si
)
, (27)
and T k
l
=
∑
f ∈Fk
λ
f
l
is the demand for CP k at leaf l. The
only costs appearing in (26) are b0, s0 and si for i ∈ I.
Capacity limited resources are considered as sunk costs and
the corresponding bn and sn are set to zero. Their utilization
is controlled by shadow prices in the form of Lagrange
multipliers.
Introduce the Lagrangian multipliers σl ≥ 0 and βn ≥ 0 for
the relaxed constraints (20) and (21), respectively, and define
the Lagrangian,
L(x, y, β, σ) =
∑
a∈A
La(x, y, β, σ),
where
La(x, y, β, σ) = Ua(x, y) −
∑
l∈La
σl
( ∑
k∈K
Clk − Sl
)
−
−
∑
n∈Na
βn
( ∑
k∈K
Λ
k
n − Bn
)
, (28)
and Ua(x, y) is given by (27). The dual of (ILP) can then be
written,
(DP) min
β≥0, σ≥0
max
x,y
L(x, y, β, σ), (29)
where x and y are subject to constraints (16) to (19). We
propose a distributed solution for (DP) where each CP places
content to maximize L for given values of β and σ while the
9Algorithm 1 Online algorithm to optimize utility (26). O
denotes the orchestrator.
.
Result: Optimal x
f
n and y
f
ln
, ∀ f , n, l
Initialization:
O: sets τ = 1, LB = 0, UB =
∑
k
∑
l T
k
l
b0, ǫ and γ.
ANO a: chooses initial σl(0) ≥ 0, βn(0) ≥ 0.
1: while UB − LB > ǫ and τ < τmax do
2: CP k: calculates optimal x f (τ) and y f (τ),∀ f ∈ Fk
3: communicates the results (22), (23), (24)
and (25) to each ANO a and to O.
4: O: LB ← max{LB,U(x(τ), y(τ))}.
5: UB ← min{UB, L(x(τ), y(τ), β(τ), σ(τ))}.
6: updates step size using (30) and sends to ANOs.
7: ANO a: updates shadow prices using (33).
8: τ = τ + 1
ANOs iteratively adjust these values using the sub-gradient
method [22]. More precisely, we suppose the CPs and ANOs
perform the distributed optimization at the start of each day,
exchanging information in rounds of primal and dual update
cycles. A third party ‘orchestrator’ (an algorithm executed in
the CO, say) is additionally informed of iteration outcomes to
determine step sizes and stopping conditions. The respective
operations are summarized in Algorithm 1 and detailed below.
1) Primal updates: The CPs have private demand estimates
λ
f
l
, know fixed prices b and s and receive proposed shadow
prices β and σ from the respective ANOs. Using these data,
CP k ∈ K computes the optimal placement of each content
f ∈ Fk by solving the UFL problem of Sec. II-C.
After performing its part of iteration τ, τ ≥ 1, each CP
k, communicates the UFL results to each ANO a and the
orchestrator in the form of cache capacities Cnk (τ) and residual
traffic demands Λkn(τ) for n ∈ Na, CO cache capacity C0k(τ)
and ANO cost share ζak(τ), and residual transit traffic Λ
k
0a
(τ).
2) Orchestration: The orchestrator is aware of capacity
constraints and verifies the feasibility of the CP results with
regard to the primal problem (ILP) . If feasible, these consti-
tute a possible solution for the (ILP). The objective functions
L and U are evaluated and compared to the current upper and
lower bounds, UB and LB, respectively. As the bounds are
updated, the CPs and ANOs must be informed to retain their
corresponding decision variables.
The orchestrator stops iterations if the found solution has an
absolute error of less than ǫ or a limit number of iterations has
been attained. In either case the ANOs and CPs are informed
and can implement the currently best feasible LB solution. If
not, the orchestrator calculates a step size δ(τ) for the next
iteration using the Polyak formula [22] and sends it to all
ANOs,
δ(τ) = γ
|L(x(τ), y(τ), β(τ), σ(τ)) − LB|
| |∇(τ)| |2
, (30)
where γ ≥ 0 is a scale factor and | |∇(τ)| |2 =
∑
n∈N ∇
B
n (τ)
2
+∑
l∈L ∇
S
l
(τ)2.∇Bn (τ) and ∇
S
n(τ) are the sub-gradients at itera-
tion τ,
∇Bn (τ) =
∑
k∈K
Λ
k
n(τ) − Bn, for n ∈ N \ 0, (31)
∇Sl (τ) =
∑
k∈K
Clk(τ) − Sl, for l ∈ L. (32)
3) Dual updates: Each ANO a adjusts the shadow prices
βn and σn for capacity limited resources n ∈ Na to more
closely match the capacity constraints. Specifically, ANO a
computes the sub-gradients ∇Bn (τ) for n ∈ Na and ∇
S
l
(τ) for
l ∈ La. Using step size (30) communicated by the orchestrator,
it computes
βn(τ + 1) =
[
βn(τ) + δ(τ)∇
B
n (τ)
]
+
, for n ∈ Na,
σl(τ + 1) =
[
σl(τ) + δ(τ)∇
S
l (τ)
]
+
, for l ∈ La, (33)
where [x]+ denotes the maximum of x and 0, and sends these
new values to the CPs and the orchestrator.
Convergence to the optimal dual solution (DP) using the
Polyak step size rule has been empirically demonstrated [22]
but may take many iterations for large problems. Any feasible
solution after a certain number of iterations is likely to be
satisfactory, however, since capacity constraints are not usually
tight (e.g., bandwidth is also used for other traffic) and slight
under-utilization does not have serious consequences.
Due to the integer nature of decision variables, it is some-
times non-trivial to find feasible solutions. However, it often
happens that the primal solution will be nearly feasible. In
these cases, the orchestrator can project the solution to a fair,
sub-optimal feasible solution for any violated constraint and
require the CP to update the other related cache size and traffic
demand variables. Alternative more sophisticated projection
heuristics, typically requiring a greater degree of cooperation
between orchestrator and CPs, might also be applied [22].
D. Settlements
The computed cache capacities Cnk are reserved for the
day. Demands T k
l
and Λkn are only estimates, however, and
ANO charges and CP subsidies are based on measured busy
period demand denoted T˜ k
l
and Λ˜kn. The ANOs pay for storage
in intermediate nodes i ∈ Ia and the CO, and for transit
bandwidth at given rates si , s0 and b0, respectively. They also
pay a subsidy to the CPs equal to a fraction of their cost
savings calculated using these fixed rates, the shadow prices
and the measured traffic. ANO a pays CP k the following
subsidy,
subak = rak ×
( ∑
l∈La
T˜ kl (βl + βp(l) + b0) −
∑
n∈Na
(Λ˜knβn) −
− Λ˜k0ab0 −
∑
l∈La
(Clkσl) −
∑
i∈Ia
(Cik si) − ζakC0k s0
)
, (34)
where p(l) ∈ Ia is the parent of leaf l and rak is the
proportionate share of overall savings negotiated between
ANO a and CP k (see Sec. IV).
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Fig. 5: Algorithm 1 applied to a symmetric network with 2 ANOs and 2 CPs;
e1 = 100, e2 = 10, b0 = $4 per Mb/s per month, s0 = si = $0.03 per GB per month.
E. Numerical application
We consider a toy network example to illustrate an applica-
tion of the method. As in Sec. II-D, to simplify the presentation
of results, we consider a symmetric 3-tier access network
where all leaves have the same demand and all links and nodes
at the same level have the same capacity. Two ANOs have
dedicated leaf and intermediate node infrastructure and access
the Internet via a common CO hub. Both ANOs have identical
demand and network capacities. The fanouts of each ANO are
e1 = 100 and e2 = 10, as in the example of Fig. 3a.
ANO users access the content of two CPs both of which
have a distinct content catalogue of 107 one megabyte files
with a Zipf(0.8) popularity distribution. Peak demand for CP
1 content from the users of each ANO is 10 Gb/s while demand
for CP 2 is twice as much.
The fixed cost of storage at the CO, s0, and at the inter-
mediate nodes, si , is $0.03 per GB while the cost of transit
bandwidth b0 is set to $4 per Mb/s. These are monthly rates
as in Sec. II-D. The other resources are provisioned by the
ANOs and are considered as sunk costs. We derive optimal
utilities, using Algorithm 1, as functions of the capacities of
the other resources, namely leaf storage Sl, leaf bandwidth Bl
and intermediate link bandwidth Bi . The negotiated fractional
shares rak of ANO savings used to subsidize the CPs are
arbitrarily set to 0.5 in all cases.
Fig. 5a shows how the intermediate link shadow price βi
varies as a function of capacity Bi while leaf storage and
bandwidth are fixed. The figure shows that βi decreases as
available capacity increases, going to zero when link capacity
ceases to be constraining. Shadow prices correspond as usual
to marginal utilities and reflect the quality of the ANO
dimensioning. They would coincide to real costs if the network
were optimally sized.
Fig. 5b plots realized gains as a function of Bi for fixed Sl
and Bl and Fig. 5c plots the same values as a function of Sl
for fixed Bl and Bi . The figures show total utility (26), the
subsidies received by each CP from (34), and the remaining
ANO utility after deduction of the subsidy (identical for both
ANOs). Total utility increases slightly as capacity grows but is
not highly sensitive due to the low cost of storage, especially
at the shared CO. Higher capacity leads to smaller shadow
prices and a greater share of the gains for the ANOs. The
shares do not reflect the 0.5 ratio rak when capacities are low
since shadow prices then contribute significantly to subsidies
but not to overall utility. CP 2 has higher demand than CP
1 and therefore yields greater cost savings. This is why its
subsidy is higher.
VI. RELATED WORK
The timely survey by Paschos et al. on the role of caching
in networks usefully highlights the significant infrastructure
economies realizable by trading off cache memory for access
network bandwidth [23]. Cited works by Borst et al. [24] and
Poularakis et al. [21] on optimal content placement in cache
hierarchies are particularly relevant. However, this prior work
does not explain how the optimal tradeoff can be realized
when CPs, who have exclusive knowledge of demand, are
hardly motivated to use this to reduce the costs incurred by
the network operator.
The business relation between ISPs and CPs is well-known
to be problematic and has given rise to much research and
discussion, notably on the issue of network neutrality. The
2009 analysis of the content delivery two-sided market by
Musacchio et al. [25] is still relevant today while forthcoming
network “cloudification” does not appear to bring obvious
simplifications (e.g., Tang and Ma [26] and Hu et al. [27]). In
our work we suppose content placement takes place under the
presently dominant, one-sided pricing model where end-user
charges pay for access network costs. CPs therefore have little
natural incentive to cooperate in minimizing these costs.
There is relatively little work that seeks to estimate the
quantitative value of the memory bandwidth tradeoff. Kelly
and Reeves [28] and Cidon et al. [29] made early contributions
brought up to date by Erman et al. [30] and Roberts and Sbihi
[5]. The present work extends the analysis of Elayoubi and
Roberts [2] for an isolated cache by considering a hierarchy
of cache locations. More significantly, we additionally design
pricing and value sharing mechanisms that incite network
operators and CPs to cooperatively realize the optimal tradeoff.
Game theory has been widely used to analyse the economic
relation between ISPs and CPs. Much of this literature makes
the assumption that CPs have an incentive to cache contents
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close to end-users in the form of improved QoE, either through
reduced latency or enhanced throughput. This is the case of
recent work by Gourdin et al. [31], Mitra et al. [32], Mitra and
Sridhar [33] and Douros et al. [19], for example. We disagree
that QoE is a sufficiently discriminating criterion since latency
in the access network is hardly impacted by negligible differ-
ences in propagation time while throughput and storage access
times can and should be controlled by adequate provisioning.
We deduce the need to introduce subsidies, in the form of side-
payments from network operators to CPs, in order to realize
the significant savings brought by optimizing the tradeoff.
Game theory is used to determine how the savings should
be shared between CPs and network operators.
When storage capacity or network bandwidth is limited,
it is necessary to partition the resource between multiple
CPs. Optimal partitioning of a limited capacity cache was
considered by Dehghan et al. [34] and Araldo et al. [35].
Both papers propose iterative schemes where partitions are
adjusted by the network operator based on observed per-CP
performance. In our network model, optimal cache partitioning
is realized by iteratively adjusting the price of storage relative
to the price of bandwidth. The CP subsidy is such that they
have an incentive to store the overall most popular contents,
up to the capacity limit. Dynamic pricing for bandwidth
sharing is the basis of network utility maximization (NUM)
as introduced by Kelly et al. [36] and applied, in particular,
to ISP–CP interaction by Hande et al. [37]. NUM is realized
through a Lagrangian decomposition of the optimization into
interacting user and network problems. In our proposal the
tradeoff optimization is split between CPs placing content
to optimize their subsidy while network operators fix prices
to maximize utilization of their limited capacity pre-installed
resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have identified the need for network operators to fi-
nancially reward CPs for placing content in access network
caches thus realizing an advantageous memory for bandwidth
tradeoff. The considerable potential savings from an optimal
tradeoff are currently not realized since the CPs, who exclu-
sively possess the necessary detailed demand data, have no
natural incentive to use this to make the optimal placement. In
our proposal, each ANO would give a subsidy to each CP that
is proportional to the realized savings. The actual proportion,
between 0 and 100%, would be determined bilaterally.
We designed a value sharing scheme where CPs maximize
their subsidy by optimally placing content items in an access
network cache hierarchy rooted at the central office. We
determined a value distribution that specifies how the cost of
the CO cache and corresponding CP subsidy should be divided
among multiple ANOs. This distribution is independent of the
individually negotiated proportions of savings handed over to
the CP.
We proposed a distributed iterative approach to optimize
the tradeoff based on Lagrangian decomposition. CPs compute
their optimal content placements in the cache hierarchy, given
unit bandwidth and storage prices, while ANOs fix shadow
prices to maximize utilization of limited capacity resources.
Neutrality is assured since prices are applied uniformly and
content items are placed optimally independently of the CP to
which they belong.
The present cache subsidy proposal is novel and consid-
erable scope to extend this preliminary analysis remains. Our
simple network model excludes certain aspects of existing and
future access networks that impact the tradeoff. For instance,
overlapping base station coverage areas or a topology with
cross links would allow cooperative caching [17]. Infrastruc-
ture sharing between ANOs in 5G networks would imply
further cost and subsidy partitions [16].
Our analysis and algorithm design can certainly be improved
in several directions. We have not thoroughly evaluated the
convergence speed and optimality gap of the proposed dis-
tributed optimisation. The subsidy has been designed so that
CPs maximize their gain by making optimal placements but
it remains to fully evaluate scope for gaming the system by
either ANOs or CPs. Fallback actions should be defined when
some ANO or CP does not participate or behaves irrationally.
Last but not least, a practical cache subsidy scheme needs
to be acceptable to ANOs and CPs. Network operators already
complain that CPs do not pay them sufficiently and will
not at all like the idea of payments going in the opposite
direction. CPs, on the other hand, are quite happy with their
lucrative business models and may not see any pressing need
to change. However, optimizing the network infrastructure is
a worthwhile societal goal leading ultimately to lower charges
to end users and greater efficiency for both network operators
and CPs. Cache subsidies are a viable means to achieve this
goal.
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